



JUSTIFYING THE EFFICACY OF CONTRACT 
DISCRIMINATION 
 HOSEA H. HARVEY† 
 In recent years, the insights of behavioral law and economics scholars 
have improved the efficacy of various forms of contract-regimes through 
substantive legal reforms ranging from the CARD Act to a revamped 
RESPA. These insights and reforms attempted to optimize consumer choice 
architecture and enhance overall consumer decision-making utility, 
primarily by a combination of new information-deployment techniques 
and various consumer nudges, in both standardized paper formats and 
online. But much more can be done to build on these insights and improve 
decision-making in this space – in order to maximize utility for historically 
marginalized groups. This Article argues that as more traditional 
commercial transactions move online, they can be more easily customized 
to directly engage consumers by directly taking into account a consumer’s 
race and other demographic factors. 
 Encouraging discrimination in contract formation comes with 
potential barriers and costs. Certain federal and state regulations prohibit 
the acquisition and use of such data. Privacy experts caution against the 
expansive use of online tools and algorithms designed to inferentially 
gather such data. Consumer demand for racially customized online 
interactions is uncertain. And, the potential for corporate misuse of such 
data, to discriminate in harmful ways, is possible. But these concerns 
should be measured against potential market benefits and can be 
addressed by rigorous data analysis of completed contracts. In certain 
regulated consumer markets, digital platforms that would seek to acquire 
race data and customize contracts would be required to permit regulators 
to evaluate whether such contract disclosures and contract terms were 
discriminatory. Ultimately, in the absence of a more transparent and 
honest dialogue about the present acquisition and use of such information 
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in online contracts, an unregulated market can utilize such information at 
will and without scrutiny – which runs the risk of harming consumers and 
carries unknown benefits. 
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INTRODUCTION: COUNTING RACE AND MAKING IT COUNT 
As individual consumers, we respond to, utilize, and learn from 
advertising, marketing, disclosure, and information regimes, in print 
and online, on a daily basis. As traditional consumer contract markets 
have moved to digital formats, contract-making has become both more 
personalized and more automated based upon the engagement of 
personal preferences.1 Many of these consumer markets are regulated 
with a light touch, if at all, and thus the full extent of a typical market-
seller’s use of a customer’s personal data to structure terms is unclear.2 
 
1 See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815 (2019) (predicting 
far greater automation of consumer transactions based on personal preferences). See also Joshua 
A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 35, 38 (2014). 
2 For this reason, it is difficult to assess whether and how the use of such data impacts 
consumer utility in those markets. To the extent that consumers are harmed in those markets, the 
interventions described here would prove costly. However, to the extent that the transparency 
proposed here identifies differential and negative market effects for certain consumer segments, 
such evidence could serve as the empirical basis to expand regulatory oversight of “light-touch” 
markets.  
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But, in other consumer markets, whether online or in-person, the federal 
government structures the methods by which market actors engage 
consumers from the earliest stages of the contract formation process, 
such as with mandated consumer disclosures for prescription drugs or 
consumer credit products.3 
This Article argues that corporations subject to these additional 
oversight regimes should be encouraged to gather socio-demographic 
information for print and online transactions and customize contracts 
based upon that information. The decision-enhancing framework 
underlying consumer disclosure law finds its original source in law and 
economics principles, namely that individuals, once identified and 
provided with information, will “rationally optimize their choices, given 
their preferences, information, and the incentives they face.”4 The Truth 
in Lending Act ("TILA") was enacted with this basic premise.5 
Moreover, information’s rationalizing effect should protect and enhance 
the interests of consumers by positioning them to make welfare-
optimizing decisions. Policymakers are increasingly relying on digital 
intermediaries to play that rationalizing role through disclosures aimed 
at machines. If those machines are supposed to help consumers, and if 
a consumer’s interests are tied to their socio-demographic background, 
why shouldn’t corporations be able to incorporate and utilize this 
information in ways consistent with decision-enhancing principles?6   
As leading scholars from other areas have recognized, race, gender 
and other factors can be excluded from evaluating and informing a 
 
3 This principle can be broadly applied to a range of government sanctioned information 
dissemination regimes. Here, the information of particular value is consumer disclosure, 
specifically with respect to consumer finance. One of the earliest modern examples of this 
strategy, of course, is pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as 
amended, (49 U.S.C. 30112(a), 30115). National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 
49 U.S.C. §§ 30112(a), 30115 (1966). Under the Act, a motor vehicle manufactured for sale in 
the United States must have affixed a label certifying compliance with various mandates and 
applicable standards. The label, among other things, must identify the vehicle's manufacturer, 
its date of manufacture, the Gross Vehicle Weight Rating or GVWR, the Gross Axle Weight 
Rating or GAWR of each axle, the vehicle type classification (e.g., passenger car, multipurpose 
passenger vehicle, truck, bus, motorcycle, trailer, low-speed vehicle), and the vehicle's Vehicle 
Identification Number or “VIN.” 49 C.F.R. § 567.4 (2013).  
4 See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1602 (2014). As explained infra, recent efforts by BLE scholars to 
improve such laws have necessarily challenged this assumption.    
5 Matthew Edwards, (quoting ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, TRUTH IN 
LENDING § 1.1.1, at 33 (4th ed. 1999) (describing TILA as “Congress’s effort to guarantee the 
accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and thereby to enable 
consumers to make informed choices in the credit marketplace”). 
6 See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267 (2017) ("The 
administrative state is leveraging algorithms to influence individuals' private decisions.") 
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decision-making process, but “from a technical perspective . . . this 
approach is naïve. Blindness to a sensitive attribute has long been 
recognized as an insufficient approach to making a process fair.”7 The 
resultant product is “insufficient to assure fairness and compliance with 
substantive policy choices.”8 Thus, to maximize the effectiveness of 
consumer transactions in a digital era, we may need to focus less on how 
such transactions affect consumers generally and more on how such 
transactions are designed for, utilized by, and impact marginalized 
consumer groups, particularly racial and ethnic groups.9 
There are critiques of this approach, discussed later in Section III, 
including whether such a regime implicates privacy concerns and 
whether government’s encouragement of “discrimination” in this 
context violates core moral or ethical principles. But it is useful to begin 
with a third critique about the underlying theory and evidence for such 
an approach: by and large, we do not know how, when, and why we 
might expect consumers from different groups to respond differently to 
particular types of contracts.10 However, this absence of evidence is 
partly because much consumer contract and behavioral law and 
economics (“BLE”) disclosure-centered scholarship has often swept 
socio-demographic variables like race under the behavioral rug, 
exacerbating this empirical dilemma. 
A. The Importance of Evaluating Racial Differences in Commercial Law 
Scholarship 
When we believe race matters, as an independent explanatory or 
causal variable to differentiate consumer interests, experiences, or 
 
7 See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, 
David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 685 (2016) 
(discussing ECOA’s Reg B. prohibitions – and their failings – within a larger framework about 
debiasing machine algorithms). 
8 Id.  
9 Though not the primary focus of this Article, financial literacy and education regimes 
similarly suffer from a lack of focus on the information needs of marginalized groups. See 
Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 228-29 (2008) 
(arguing that remedies must be context-specific to be impactful). See also Final Report 
President’s Advisory Council on Financial Capability, FINAL REPORT, 10 (2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financial-
education/Documents/PACFC%20Interim%20Report%20-%20January%2018,%202012.pdf 
(stating that recommendations should “take into account the particular needs of traditionally 
underserved populations (e.g., women, minorities, low- and moderate-income consumers, and 
the elderly)").  
10 See, e.g., Dalié Jiménez, D. James Greiner, Lois R. Lupica & Rebecca L. Sandefur, 
Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A 
Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 449 (2013). 
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contract outcomes, academics and government policy makers should 
encourage private actors and government regulators to acquire that 
information and then to utilize it to inform or improve law and public 
policy.11 Similarly, when we see an absence of effort to gather or analyze 
or deploy such information, it sends a clear message that the underlying 
social phenomenon or policy problem either should not or does not 
implicate race or racial justice matters. In short, when race matters, 
government and private actors should count it, analyze it, and use the 
resulting knowledge and information to reduce disparities and improve 
public welfare.12 Within academia, we expect the same level of effort.13 
While encouraging the acquisition of racial demographics for 
commercial transactions may not always yield an obvious net utility,14 
there is general agreement that racial difference permeates a variety of 
consumer contract regimes in a variety of ways.15 But, in the context of 
recognizing the role of race in communicating with consumers, legal 
scholars in other fields are far ahead of commercial law academics.16 
B. Generic Consumer Contract Approaches 
We know the fallacy of the central assumption of traditional law and 
economics approaches to individual decision making — that consumers 
are rational maximizers of their strategic goals.17,18 Drawing upon social 
science research, BLE scholars proved that human behavior and 
 
11 This assumes that government generally seeks to make such policies better, rather than 
worse.  
12 See Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic Inclusion: Asian Americans 
and the Voting Rights Act, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359 (2013) (advocating for broader data 
gathering and data analysis by race to improve efficacy of voting rights laws). 
13 See, e.g., Gregory S. Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J. OF L. AND 
PUB. POL. 683 (2008) (encouraging critical race theorists to deploy social science data analysis 
methodologies when analyzing law and public policy problems). See also Devon W. Carbado & 
Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 
149 (2014) (explaining how social science research offers critical race theory scholars a useful 
methodology). 
14 See Jonathan D. Kahn, Patenting Race, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Nov. 2006, at 1349 
(2006) (raising concerns about utilizing race as a variable when petitioning the government in 
patent and drug-approval spaces).  
15 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 579-
80 (2016) (observing that sellers’ algorithms have the potential to lessen some forms of racial 
discrimination and exacerbate others). 
16 See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent — Lessons from 
Social Science, 36 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 150 (2008) (gathering and analyzing empirical and 
historical data to re-contextualize the role of race and ethnicity in informed consent agreements). 
17 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
18 Bubb and Pildes, supra note 4. 
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decision-making consistently differs from that of the rational actor.19 
Accordingly, such scholars contend that policymakers should legislate 
with an eye toward “minimiz[ing] the individual mistakes that create 
behavioral market failures and . . . mitigate their negative 
consequences.”20 With respect to one such area of law, disclosure law 
regimes, they believe that government-mandated disclosures – provided 
through market intermediaries, should “focus . . . on helping [real] 
people help themselves.”21  
“To date, the work in BLE has been surprisingly circumscribed,”22 
and, by assuming that “many” or “most” consumers exhibit the same 
behavioral biases that impact rational decision-making in the same way, 
much BLE literature falls victim to the presumptive errors also made in 
law and economics theory.23 In other words, BLE improves upon 
rational-actor models by anticipating predictable forms of decision-
making errors, but also assumes that all consumers act irrationally in 
consistent ways or make imperfect decisions using information in a 
predictably imperfect manner. By baselining these models, and then 
subsequent policy and law derived therefrom, on a “universal” person, 
this suggests, but does not explicitly state, that the consumer is racially 
white – and male.24  
Thus, when relying on this assumption of a mythical universal 
generic consumer, there is less need to engage the efficacy, impact, or 
value of incorporating consumer demographic differences in consumer 
contracts, as there is no accompanying theoretical explanation for why 
such consumers would be expected to process information differently or 
yield different utility from similar decisions. Therefore, if this core BLE 
assumption were true, disclosure models or digital “smart contracts” 
created for a singular class of “irrational” consumers would prove 
effective in reducing noise, increasing decision-making efficiencies, 
and leaving consumers better off – as a whole – than without the 
information.  
But what if a contract formation’s utility function varies across a 
range of socio-demographic groups? For example, one of the few large-
 
19 See, e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 17. 
20 Bubb and Pildes, supra note 4, at 1605. 
21 Id. at 1604. 
22 Id. 
23 Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew 
Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2003). (“[W]e can divide consumers into two 
types: those who are boundedly rational (in the sense described above) and those who are fully 
rational; and that (2) a fraction, p, of consumers fall into the boundedly rational category.”), 
24 See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1999). 
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scale credit-granting disclosure experiments confirms that the quality 
and visibility of consumer disclosures specifically matter for vulnerable 
high-risk populations, who “are rate sensitive only if the interest rate 
information is prominently disclosed.”25 Similarly, the empirical 
relationship between contract-formation choices, credit-card profiles, 
and certain socio-demographic information (especially race) is still 
uncertain, though suggestive of group-based differences.26 Therefore, it 
is consistent with the limited scholarship that exists that certain 
population sub-groups could react sub-optimally (or simply differently) 
to proposed contracts and terms that others (a majority) use efficiently 
and rationally.27 If this is true, even rational economic decision making 
- mediated through information - is not uniformly distributed.28 Yet, 
contract disclosure and formation defaults, particularly as they are 
operationalized – in style, language, and substance – are effectively 
white. But in the digital world, the provision of information and 
disclosure could instead be focused on customizing the contract 
formation process to maximize the economic-utility and welfare of 
population sub-groups.29 If the provision of information can be designed 
to maximize the utility of sub-groups such that it serves to enhance not 
 
25 See Bruno Ferman, Reading the Fine Print: Credit Demand and Information Disclosure 
in Brazil, 62 MGMT. SCI. 3534 (2015) (conducting a large-scale credit card disclosure 
experiment in Brazil and finding, in part, that “most borrowers are highly rate-sensitive, whether 
or not interest rates are prominently disclosed in marketing materials. An exception is high-risk 
borrowers, for whom rate disclosure matters.”) 
26 A number of studies have shown correlation between (perceived) race and credit scores, 
suggesting that, in fact, there are clear financial health differences by population, although the 
causes of such differences remain largely unknown. See, e.g., EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record 
(statement of Adam T. Klein) (citing the 2000 Freddie Mac National Consumer Credit Survey) 
(correlation between race and credit score); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND 
AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 80–81 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. (finding 
African-Americans and Latinos have lower credit scores than other racial/ethnic groups); Matt 
Fellowes, Brookings Inst., CREDIT SCORES, REPORTS, AND GETTING AHEAD IN AMERICA 2 
(2006), https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-scores-reports-and-getting-ahead-in-
america (showing correlation between percentage of racial minority residents and a U.S. 
county’s average credit score).  
27 See, e.g., David Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes 
Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 (2016) (demonstrating, in part, that socio-demographic 
differences in consumer groups are associated with differing views about the contract formation 
process and the implications for contract breach). 
28 See, e.g., Mintel, HISPANIC FINANCES AND FINANCIAL SERVICES (2009) (finding higher 
Latino race-differential response rates to the question “I know nothing about financial 
services/investments.”) 
29 See Shmuel I. Becher, Yuval Feldman, and Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case 
of High-Cost Credit and Payday Loans in LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF MARKETING THEORY, 
Jacob Gersen & Joel Steckel, eds., Cambridge University Press (2019, Forthcoming).  
54               JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION [Vol. 2: 47 
only the general public welfare but the welfare and maximal utility of 
sub-groups as well, the result would be a more optimal outcome than 
the status-quo.30 And while some scholars have innovatively encouraged 
a “performance test” of various disclosure and contract-formation 
regimes to further enhance consumer utility, 31 such tests still compare 
the utility maximizing effect of such differentiated regimes on the 
outcomes for the consumer population as a whole – rather than distinct 
sub-groups. Instead, the approach here contemplates a variant of what 
others have described as a consumer finance “randomized control trial,” 
in which digital experimentation with how consumer contract 
disclosures are provided and the efficacy of particular terms will allow 
for a real-time gathering of evidence of what works best – holding the 
socio-demographics of the reference-group constant.32 Such 
experimentation can be achieved faster through digital contracts and the 
use of online platforms, which would also allow for a more rapid 
aggregation of evidence about the efficacy of this approach. 
However, recognizing that this approach is not without its 
weaknesses, this Article responds to those who may believe this 
approach to contract formation will do more harm than good.33 
I. CRITIQUES OF DISCLOSURE LAW AND A CRITIQUE OF THOSE 
CRITIQUES  
Because the purpose of disclosure law, as mentioned, is to enable 
rational decision-making by consumers, the law and economics 
movement—and its critics—have comprised the foundation of scholarly 
commentary on the impact and efficacy of consumer disclosure laws, to 
the exclusion of those focused on achieving racial justice. Most 
 
30 See Kroll, et. al., supra note 7, at 682 (acknowledging privacy concerns and reviewing 
potential discriminatory effects in using algorithms but suggesting that “there may be cases 
where allowing an algorithm to consider protected class status can actually make outcomes 
fairer. This may require a doctrinal shift, as, in many cases, consideration of protected status in 
a decision is presumptively a legal harm.”) 
31 Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1316 
(2015) (footnotes omitted). 
32 See, e.g., Jimenez et. al., supra note 10, at 470 (describing a large-scale mixed-methods 
research study to gauge the effectiveness of financial health interventions via a “consumer 
incentive to undergo financial counseling, an offer of attorney representation, and the two 
treatments in combination.”) 
33 See, e.g., Lea Shepard, Toward A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 
53 B.C.L. REV. 1695, 1711-718 (2012) (questioning empirical assumptions associated with an 
employer’s use of job applicants’ financial histories and arguing, in part, for a more robust anti-
discrimination norm with respect to consumer credit-information regimes due to the potential 
racially disparate impact associated with their use.) 
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particularly, the behavioral economics movement has dedicated 
significant resources “to tak[ing] the core insights and successes of 
economics and build[ing] upon them by making more realistic 
assumptions about human behavior . . . [seeking to provide] a better 
description of the behavior of the agents in society and the economy.”34 
Such scholars have drawn upon psychological and sociological 
scholarship that has not only acknowledged the countless cultural and 
environmental factors that impact how individuals respond to contract-
formation stimuli, but have also embraced them as variables to predict 
future behavior.  
But, this scholarship has failed to acknowledge, explain, or even 
identify whether – and how – race, ethnicity, and other socio-
demographics impact – or are impacted by – the very disclosure regimes 
such scholars seek to change. Thus, celebrated law scholars in this space 
whose work is rightly lauded for its general behavioral insights have 
remained curiously silent about whether sub-group differences exist in 
responding to optimizing information distribution in similar welfare 
enhancing ways.35  
Current scholarship denotes disclosure policy as a political device 
designed to remedy information asymmetries in the market place.36 
Nonetheless, those endorsing such laws and regulations cannot ignore 
evidence identifying the deficiencies in disclosure law’s 
implementation. Those questioning the merit of the current regime 
predominantly point to “empirical evidence and theories regarding 
consumer behavior,” “deficiencies of the disclosures themselves,” as 
well as “the [in]ability or [un]likelihood [that] consumers . . . use the 
 
34 Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998). 
35 Pathbreaking in a variety of ways, such works simply fail to engage the role of consumer 
race, ethnicity, and culture (as well as sex), as if these variables are not factors in how consumers 
receive, process, or act on disclosure. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY 
CONTRACT (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2015). Perhaps one reason these scholars 
and others see disclosure as so ineffective is precisely because of its lack of experimental 
differentiation with terms across consumer sub-groups. Compare this absence of discussion in 
commercial law literature with the engagement of race variables and critical theory in other 
substantive fields, such as health law. See, e.g., Khiara Bridges, Terence Keel & Osagie K. 
Obasogie, Introduction: Critical Race Theory & the Health Sciences, in Symposium Critical 
Race Theory & the Health Sciences, 43 AM. J. OF LAW & MED. 179 (2017). 
36 Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: 
Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 
(2005). 
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information”37 among the reasons for its ineffectiveness. Perhaps the 
absence of much socio-demographic information is the real cause.  
Scholars have also identified the possibility of supply-side issues – 
that the complexity and volume of information may render it 
meaningless to a confused or overwhelmed consumer. First, evidence 
has shown that complexities in the law itself can stunt the compliance 
efforts of regulated entities.38 While this is true for all populations, there 
is increasing evidence that demonstrates that the complexity is 
particularly salient for population sub-groups more so than the general 
population and that it causes members of these sub-groups to make, on 
average, more inefficient decisions with the same information.39 
Similarly, an oft-cited defect of contract-formation that behavioral 
theorists recognize is “information overload,” the argument that 
“consumers [are] cognitively unable to cope with the voluminous nature 
of the mandated . . . disclosures.”40 With respect to TILA, subsequent to 
its 1980 emendation, scholarship dedicated to dissecting this particular 
issue somewhat subsided.41 Nonetheless, “home mortgage borrowers 
[are still] . . . buried in paper, with little guidance as to which documents 
contain the most crucial information to facilitate credit decision-
making.”42 Most (if not all) consumers find this problem familiar, as 
they attempt to process overwhelming amounts of information online to 
make the most efficient contracting choices.  
II. IMPLEMENTATION  
The following examples build on a premise not universally shared 
by BLE scholars – that particular population sub-groups may exhibit 
non-random decision-making errors with respect to evaluating contract 
disclosures and terms.43 This non-random error distribution can result 
 
37 Id. at 204. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Kleimann Communication Group, KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: POST-PROPOSAL 
CONSUMER TESTING FOR THE CFPB OF THE SPANISH AND REFINANCE INTEGRATED TILA-
RESPA DISCLOSURES (2015) (discussed infra). 
40 Edwards, supra note 36, at 221. 
41 Edwards attributes three explanations to this: (1) “the application of information overload 
theory to legal regulation has been subjected to a significant amount of scrutiny and criticism,” 
(2) wariness surrounding “advocating a position that might lead towards recommendations of 
less disclosure for consumers,” and finally, (3) that the amended regulations arguably 
“ameliorated the worst of TILA’s overload problems.” Id. at 222. 
42 Id. at 223. 
43 See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher et. al., supra note 29 (explaining that certain BLE assumptions 
about consumer financial behavior are not evenly associated with certain groups – and may be 
particularly flawed for marginalized groups.) 
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from a variety of causes. Here, I’ll focus on three of them: (a) language 
barriers, (b) unique socio-demographic differences in the processing or 
utilization of information, or (c) a non-randomly distributed lack of 
engagement with information. Each of these root causes, if proven, 
would lead to a different set of proposed information-based solutions 
particularly suitable for digital transactions, in part because the costs 
typically associated with the deployment of socio-demographically 
varied disclosure and terms in print form would be substantially 
reduced. We can think about these solutions as falling within three broad 
frameworks: (a) improving contract-formation utility by clarification, 
(b) improving contract-formation utility by addition of group-relevant 
topics, and (c) improving contract-formation utility by individuation. 
Each of these solutions requires the gathering and use of socio-
demographic variables and robust evidence testing. Each of them is also 
particularly easy to test and execute for digital contracts, because a 
controlled experiment incorporating the modification of contract terms 
or disclosure language and evaluating differential responses can be 
accomplished at higher speed and lower cost than creating, distributing, 
and evaluating responses from differentiated printed and distributed 
versions of the same material.    
 
   Example: Online Credit Card Applications 
 
In order to prove a claim that the utility of information might vary 
across subgroups, one would prefer empirical validation from real-
world evidence. Lacking that in this case forces speculation – on both 
sides. On the one hand, BLE scholars assume without proof that no 
differences exist, and their models reflect this. Here, as a thought 
experiment, let me illustrate a universe where the utility of contract-
formation information does vary across subgroups – in order to 
postulate what we might do in response were this to be so. 
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First, let us imagine a scenario where, prior to the implementation of 
the Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure (“CARD”) Act’s revised 
disclosure and education model, a simulated online test was run using 
three versions of that model. One of the goals of the new model 
embedded within the CARD Act is to educate consumers that an 
increase in the amount paid per month will reduce the overall cost of a 
medium-term extension of credit.44 The goal is to increase monthly 
payments through the education function of disclosure, which over time 
will enhance the welfare of consumers because they will spend less 
money for the extension of credit over time. Let us speculate that three 
different versions of online disclosure were tested with that goal in 
mind, across particular demographic sub-groups with the same number 
of participants, with results as follows:45 
 
In the above experimental framework, the primary goal is to 
maximize the additional monthly payment of the consumer population 
as a whole in order to reduce the long-term cost of credit. In that 
scenario, Disclosure B is the optimal choice, because it maximizes the 
average additional payment for the entire population. But what if the 
information effects of the disclosure are not randomly distributed across 
different groups? Disclosures A and C represent that scenario, which 
this Article suggests is more likely than not. Comparing Disclosure A to 
Disclosure C, if the goal is to maximize overall welfare, Disclosure C is 
the preferred choice. Most groups will increase their minimum 
payments, even if two groups do not. But if the goal is to increase 
 
44 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 969, 1003-05 (2012).  
45 The amount is the increase in average monthly payments made pursuant to a given type 
of disclosure, with red amounts signifying that the disclosures resulted in a decreased average 
monthly payment.  
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payments while also minimizing harm (reducing payments), Disclosure 
A is the correct choice. How then to maximize utility for all groups? In 
the world of digital contracting, it would be possible, instantly, to 
display the utility maximizing disclosure at the beginning of the 
formation process – to different consumer groups – yielding optimal 
choices.  
The aforementioned example illustrate the limits of both the law and 
economics and BLE approaches to disclosure and contract formation. It 
is not just that consumers are not rational. It is not just that BLE insights 
can help reduce general error rates across the entire population. In fact, 
it may be that error rates are non-randomly distributed across groups for 
a variety of reasons, and if so, corrective measures require a 
differentiated and discriminating contract formation regime to 
maximize the utility of sub-groups collectively. This will allow for 
higher social welfare across all groups compared to a standardized 
approach using a single blunt disclosure instrument or formation 
method. And digital platforms provide both an easy test method and a 
cost-less ability to make contract-formation changes.   
But why might decision-making errors be non-randomly distributed 
across certain consumer populations and how would a race-conscious 
contract-formation process solve for them? A few detailed examples 
might provide further context. First, language differences might result 
in formation inefficiencies. Second, socio-demographic differences 
might cause formation inefficiencies. Finally, differentials in consumer 
engagement with contract terms and disclosures might cause formation 
inefficiencies. Let’s take each case in turn.  
A. Language Barriers 
Scholars have focused on comprehension issues with respect to 
disclosure, insofar as disclosures are to be designed to reflect a uniform 
consensus about how standard English language speakers process 
information. Even if one accepts as a given that disclosures are generally 
designed to reflect text for consumers with an 8th grade reading level, this 
still presumes that all consumers read English at that level – and in the 
same way. These assumptions are false.46  
 
46 Almost ¼ of the U.S. population over the age of 5 speaks a language other than English 
at home. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, 
Language Spoken At Home by Ability to Speak English for the Population 5 Years and Over 
(“2016 ACS Home Language Data”), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_B16001&prodType=table. 
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One real-life illustration of this fallacy shall suffice. The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) thoughtfully reassessed its 
consumer education program with respect to Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and TILA disclosures for home-buyers, and it 
launched an innovative new education regime for the entire U.S. 
population of mortgage consumers. 47 Proactively recognizing that a large 
segment of U.S. home buyers spoke Spanish as a first language, the CFPB 
undertook the process of translating the finished English-language 
mortgage acquisition information and disclosure materials into Spanish. 
This is no small empirical feat. Literal translation – of the Google Translate 
variety – is not effective for the sort of sophisticated consumer education 
such documents are intended to convey. Further, dictionary translations 
across languages have at their core a false equivalency assumption – 
namely that standard and familiar terms can be easily translated across 
languages without cultural context clues.48  
 After the CFPB outsourced its English-language disclosure and 
information materials and translated the material for a Spanish language 
audience, the CFPB and its language translation team learned through 
small-scale focus group testing that the translations were not effective.49 
In their words, their translation team “identified particular concepts that 
could pose problems in the translation. These concepts did not translate 
directly into Spanish, did not have a definite term across multiple dialects, 
or the concepts behind the terms were inherently difficult. These terms 
included: Appraisal, Balloon Payment, Borrower, Escrow, Final Payment, 
and Origination Charges.”50  
Through extensive revision, the CFPB was able to find the appropriate 
language benchmarks, notwithstanding inter-cultural differences in 
 
47 See Alexander Bader, Truly Protecting the Consumer in Light of the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis: How Generally Applicable State Consumer Protection Laws Must Be a Key Tool in 
Keeping Lending Institutions Honest, 25 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 767, 782-83 (2011) (“[A]n 
unfortunate reality of both RESPA, and its predecessor TILA, is that they had little effect on 
borrowers’ decision-making because many mortgages are difficult for a lay person to understand 
on his or her own.”). 
48 Consider a reverse example. The Korean idiom 똥 묻은 개가 겨 묻은 개 나무란다 
literally translates in English to “A dog with feces scolds a dog with husks of grain” when in its 
cultural context, is meant to communicate an idea similar to the English-language idiom “People 
who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.” 
49 The difficulty of having an English dominant approach to multi-lingual focus groups, the 
challenge of translating concepts, and the interpretation of the meaning of such concepts as tied 
to identity are difficult subjects for any researcher to tackle, especially the CFPB. See, e.g., 
Taeku Lee, Language-of-Interview Effects and Latino Mass Opinion (April 2001). JOHN F. 
KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT FACULTY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES 01-041.  
50 See Kleinmann Communication Group, supra note 39, at p. vi.  
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interpretation across various Spanish-speaking subgroups.51 In 2016, the 
CFPB’s mortgage disclosure and information regimes were finally 
translated to Spanish as a result of an expensive and thoughtful proactive 
government response. How should the remaining millions of non-native 
English speaking home-buyers be educated about the process of home 
ownership? Should government bear the considerable burden of multiple 
iterations and translations of standard disclosures?52 If not, should 
financial institutions and other large corporations be accountable?53 If 
neither should be accountable (as most present regimes contemplate), how 
should we expect millions of English as a second language speakers to 
correctly interpret disclosure materials and contract terms that they not 
only do not understand in English but that may, in fact, be incorrectly 
“translated” into false-equivalent terms through the use of basic 
technological translation devices that consumers might seek on their own? 
The solution is straightforward – allowing for consumers to have 
unrestricted language opt-in and requiring testing and refining of 
translated disclosure by regulated entities. Further, the dissemination cost 
(and perhaps the efficacy) of such disclosure is substantially reduced when 
it is deployed through digital methods, rather than burdensome traditional 
mailings or in-person lengthy disclosure forms. 
B. Socio-demographic Decision-Making and Behavioral Differences  
Levels of financial education, educational attainment, and the 
interactions of those factors with a consumer’s socio-demographics may 
structure market choices and contract formation in complicated ways.54 
But the provision of standardized disclosure and standardized contract 
terms ignores these differences and assumes a uniform mono-cultural 
response. And, financial regulations like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(“ECOA”) impose race-gathering restrictions on various creditors and 
financial institutions and prohibit them from considering a consumer’s 
 
51 Id. 
52 As of January 2019, consumer ECOA guidance brochures, for example, are only available 
in English and Spanish. See Final Language Access Plan for the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/11/16/2017-24854/final-
language-access-plan-for-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau#footnote-4-p53482 (Last 
visited Feb. 24, 2019).  
53 Market leaders may benefit by customer acquisition and satisfaction if they engage this 
effort. See, e.g., Molly Kissler, 400,000 Chase customers opt for Spanish-language statements, 
PHX. BUS. J. (Aug. 6, 2010), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2010/08/02/daily72.html (describing Chase’s 
commitment to Spanish-language access.) 
54 See Richard Epstein, The Dangerous Allure of Libertarian Paternalism, 5 REV. OF 
BEHAV. ECON. (2018) at 405-406. 
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background, even when such consideration might benefit the consumer, or 
at the very least, provide the consumer with data that could be used in a 
potential claim for effects-based discrimination.55 
Compare the commercial-law approach to race-uniform decision-
making to decision-making architecture in other areas. For instance, 
medical research shows disparities in the ways in which different races and 
genders approach medical issues.56 Analyzing the differences in disease 
and treatment across different races/ethnic groups and genders has become 
a focus of medical research in topics ranging from lung cancer57 to heart 
disease,58 including over 200 drugs that currently have an FDA label 
including specific genetic recommendations – all in order to maximize not 
the “general health” but sub-population health.59 Thus, health research and 
policy increasingly affirmatively discriminates with respect to information 
provided to consumers. While this approach has been met by some 
 
55 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial 
Regulatory Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts, CQ 
TRANSCRIPTIONS, LLC, 19-20 (July 15, 2009), stating that 
 
 A final data limitation is that depository institution regulators generally do not have 
access to personal characteristics data (for example, race, ethnicity, and sex) for 
nonmortgage loans, such as business, credit card, and automobile loans. In a 2008 
report, we reported that Federal Reserve Regulation B generally prohibits lenders from 
requesting and collecting such personal characteristic data from applicants for 
nonmortgage loans. . . . In the absence of personal characteristic data for nonmortgage 
loans, we found that agencies tended to focus their oversight activities more on 
mortgage lending rather than on areas such as automobile, credit card, and business 
lending that are also subject to fair lending law. . . . [S]uch procedures had a high 
potential for error and were time-consuming and costly. 
 
56 Anna Kline, Pathways into Drug User Treatment: The Influence of Gender and 
Racial/Ethnic Identity, 31:3 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 323 (1996) (analyzing patterns of 
behavior in different races and genders; finding, for instance, that ‘Hispanics’ were more likely 
to delay medical treatment than other races due a discomfort or reluctance to acknowledge their 
addictions). 
57 Delia A. Dempsey et al., Genetic and Pharmacokinetic Determinants of Response to 
Transdermal Nicotine in White, Black and Asian Non- Smokers, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS (2013) (available at doi:10.1038/clpt.2013.159) (stating that lung cancer is 
typically correlated with smoking behavior, such as number of cigarettes per day and ability to 
quit, and such behavior is linked to the rate of metabolism of nicotine, which varies by race and 
ethnicity).  
58 Nicholas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued... N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/weekinreview/14nick.html?_r=0 (discussing research that 
indicated that the heart disease medication BiDil was more successful in treating Black patients 
and discussed the human genome project, which is likely to produce diagnostic tests and 
treatments specifically tailored to specific populations). 
59 Linda M. Hunt, Nicole D. Truesdell, & Meta J. Kreiner, Genes, Race, and Culture in 
Clinical Care: Racial Profiling in the Management of Chronic Illness, 27:2 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 253 (2013). 
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criticism, medical research continues to look for areas to personalize 
medicine – by race – in order to increase its effectiveness.60 
C. Differential Disengagement  
Much has been written about whether individuals actually read 
disclosure, concluding that they do not, we accept the insights of that 
literature as given.61 Thus, a portion of the population derives no utility 
from disclosure. If non-readers generally make less efficient choices for 
contract terms, how might the existing disclosure regime be modified to 
induce the behavior that it seeks? Questions regarding the quality of 
information provided in a disclosure and the nexus of such information to 
being read and understood are difficult to answer and rarely asked.62 
Some speculations follow. Perhaps a consumer might opt into interest-
based financial education through a disclosure regime by an online 
provider.63 The provider might be permitted to inquire about a consumer’s 
key interests (whether sports, dance, film, etc.) Then, disclosures and 
explanations of key contract terms could be modified or supplemented 
with consumer finance scenarios that directly engaged the consumer’s core 
interests. For example, a music fan might receive a disclosure that 
involved purchasing a pair of concert tickets on a credit card and 
explaining how the face-value of the tickets might not reflect the actual 
cost if the tickets were carried as credit card debt for three months at a 
given interest rate. Perhaps the information could use music analogies or 
local artists as examples to generate more consumer interest and thus 
increase the likelihood that the disclosure would be both accessed and 
understood.  
With due care, lenders could also use cultural references that resonated 
with their audience. Thoughtful critics have suggested that tailored 
messages during contract formation might prove to be culturally 
insensitive. One response might be that, at present, the entire online 
 
60 Id. (stating, “[s]ome argue that taking race/ethnicity into consideration is clinically useful 
and can provide convenient insight into a patients’ genetic heritage, behavioral habits, and 
socioeconomic status (citation omitted). Others argue that such practices are not scientifically 
defensible and may increase disparities by promoting stereotyping.”) 
61 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter?, NYU LAW & ECON. RES. 
PAPER NO. 10-54 (2010). 
62 See, e.g., J. H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 899, 939 (2015) (evaluating information-forcing default rule research about how 
to make such rules effective, and finding only “a few scholars” have produced such work.)  
63 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011) 
(providing framework for how such an approach can balance privacy and information security 
and be achieved using traditional contract principles). 
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contract formation regime is culturally insensitive, because it simply 
ignores race and other variables under the guise of a uniform “generic” 
disclosure or standard set of formation terms. In short, if consumers who 
are not presently engaged with the information in the disclosure were 
provided incentives to read the disclosure, those incentives would improve 
utility at no cost to those who did not receive the information.64 Or, more 
creatively, disclosures could take the form of videos, snapchats, music, or 
other forms of communication that might more effectively reach and 
engage the intended audience.65 Though this technique does not require 
the use of race variables, the methodology by which customers preference-
ordered or shared information might be correlative.66 
Therefore, with respect to the broad categories above (language access 
differences, socio-demographic or cultural differences, and information 
engagement differences), the gathering of socio-demographic information 
and its associated use to calibrate more efficient and effective contracts 
would have the net effect of enhancing overall consumer utility and net 
utility of marginalized groups. Further, corporations that excel at reducing 
such disparities would retain a unique marketplace advantage: proof that 
diverse customers of “Citilend” default on loans less frequently, 
demonstrate greater increases in credit scores over time, are more likely to 
gain access to other credit products, and other such indicators would 
enhance Citilend’s customer base and serve to calibrate its brand identity, 
particularly within communities that are skeptical of large financial 
institutions.67 But right now, with government controlling and mandating 
 
64 In other contexts, such as Google Ad placement, responses to inquires suggested that 
perceived race of the person “queried” was utilized to differentiate ads returned in the query 
response, presumably maximized to get a higher click-through rate. See Latanya Sweeney, 
Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, DATA PRIV, LAB (2013), 
https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/onlineads/1071-1.pdf). Such algorithms could also be used to 
create, modify, or supplement disclosures in a manner consistent with the grantee’s requests for 
more information.  
65 See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1032–34 (2012). 
66 In an alternative framework (separate from race), for example, lenders and issuers could 
ask a series of drop-down questions about a consumer’s interests (similar to how Tivo or Netflix 
or Amazon fine-tune recommendations based on ratings and/or viewing/buying behavior). This 
preference ordering could be used to deliver extremely granular information –making it more 
likely to be seen and utilized by the consumer. I thank Josh Bowers for this observation. 
67 See, e.g., Erik Oster, Most Marketers Agree Diverse Images in Ads Help a Brand’s 
Reputation, According to New Report, ADWEEK (Dec. 5, 2017), available at 
https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/most-marketers-agree-diverse-images-in-ads-help-
a-brands-reputation-according-to-new-report/ (explaining that in product advertising, for 
example, “[m]arketers are also recognizing that choosing images that are relatable to diverse 
groups benefits their brand’s reputation.”); See also Phil Schrader, Why Committing to LGBT 
Equality and Embracing a Diverse Workplace Is So Good for Brands, ADWEEK (April 16, 2017) 
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the entirety of the disclosure product in many regimes, the marketplace 
value (for providers and consumers) for better financial disclosure, among 
other things, is simply unknown.68  
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE SUB-GROUP DISCRIMINATION APPROACH  
A restructuring of our existing approaches to contract disclosure and 
formation to incorporate consumer-level sub-group differences might raise 
a variety of objections. First, what evidence do we have that subgroup-
specific disclosures would lead to more efficient consumer behaviors than 
the existing disclosure models? Second, the gathering and use of this 
information raises online privacy concerns. Third, to successfully 
implement a sub-group disclosure and formation model, government must 
permit discrimination–or at least delineation–between certain types of sub-
groups at a time when such discrimination is frowned upon in other 
contexts.  
The first objection, lack of evidentiary proof of sub-group differential 
disclosure efficiency, is firmly rooted in empirics–and an absence of 
evidence. We know that a uniform format and dissemination model, in 
some contexts, works to enhance decision-making and utility for the group 
as a whole.69 We do not know, as applied, whether it works the same way 
for population sub-groups, and there are a variety of reasons discussed 
above to think that it may be harmful. The best way that we can acquire 
objective answers to that question would be to permit or encourage a 
natural information experiment.70 Those who believe that responses to 
disclosure and consumer errors are not randomly distributed across groups 
are most likely to permit or encourage a natural information experiment. 
Whereas those who believe that consumer errors are randomly distributed 
would continue to prefer the current regime. Certainly, large scale focus 
group testing could be conducted by corporations, by the CFPB, or by 
researchers. But here the focus is on real-world financial behavior and 
 
available at https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/why-committing-to-lgbt-equality-and-
embracing-a-diverse-workplace-is-so-good-for-brands/ ) (LGBT equality measures and sub-
group centered initiatives benefit corporations by attracting talent, among other factors.) 
68 See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public Resources, 103 CAL. L. REV. 
1515, 1552-53 (2015) (describing valuation inefficiencies for public resources when exclusive 
government control of the resource obviates natural open-market pricing mechanisms).  
69 See generally KAZUHISA TAKEMURA, BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF HUMAN CHOICE BEHAVIOR (2014).  
70 See generally Jimenez et. al., supra note 10. Of course, researchers in this space can 
conduct focus groups and surveys, which are valid measurement tools and would inform this 
discussion. But here one should be particularly concerned with measuring real outcomes under 
real conditions–and the most critical experimental tool is thus the changing of disclosure–in 
context.  
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outcomes for marginalized groups in the United States–not merely 
opinions about a consumer’s hypothetical behavior over time–and so any 
conclusions drawn from such field or one-off experiments would be 
necessarily limited for this reason.71  
But the lack of empirics may exacerbate the problem. For example, 
“information on consumer race and ethnicity is required to conduct fair 
lending analysis of non-mortgage credit products, but auto lenders and 
other non-mortgage lenders are generally not allowed to collect 
consumers’ demographic information. As a result, substitute, or “proxy” 
information is utilized to fill in information about consumers’ 
demographic characteristics.”72 And these proxies are quite imprecise.  
The second objection, that encouraging individuals to further identify 
race and other socio-demographic factors in online contracting may 
implicate privacy concerns, prompts a few responses.73 First, failing to ask 
about socio-demographic factors may signal government’s disinterest or 
communicate that government thinks race, in this setting, is not important. 
Second, such that permitting the use of such variables enables consumers 
to promote self-realization or positive identity construction, the ability to 
self-identify race and other factors in consumer contract regimes subject 
to certain restrictions can serve to enhance, not undermine, individual 
interests.74 Third, the nexus of socio-demographics to privacy in the digital 
era is less clear than one might expect, given that privacy law scholars 
have not typically engaged race and other socio-demographics as key data-
 
71 But see Marianne Bertrand, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir, & Jonathan 
Zinman, What's Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field 
Experiment, 125 Q. J. ECON. 263, 263 (2010) (discussing a South African experiment 
demonstrating that consumers responded differentially to a loan-advertisement’s experimentally 
varied terms and content). However, the path-breaking study was necessarily limited to a 
specific context: “mailers were sent exclusively to clients who successfully repaid prior loans 
from the Lender. Most had been to a branch within the past year and hence were familiar with 
the loan product, the transaction process, the branch’s staff and general environment, and the 
fact that loan uses are unrestricted.” Further, the study’s exploration of the nexus of cultural or 
racial cues to response rates was inconclusive, “Given our lack of strong priors on how any 
advertising content effects might vary with consumer characteristics, and statistical power 
issues, we will not devote much space to discussing heterogeneity in responses to advertising 
content.” 
72 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Proxy Methdology Report 3 (2014), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_report_proxy-methodology.pdf. 
73 See Shmuel I. Becher et. al., supra note 29, at 31 (acknowledging same with respect to 
tailoring proposals to low income consumers); See also Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic 
Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2013). 
74 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33:2 
SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 373-74 (2003). 
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points warranting additional scrutiny.75 And, such that socio-demographic 
data obtained through this process is abused or misused, government can 
design remedies designed to penalize merchants who violate a consumer’s 
and the government’s expectations about the sharing, use, or misuse of this 
particularly personal information.76 Alternatively, companies choosing to 
gather and use such data for these purposes could be encouraged to provide 
for warnings or disclosures or “demographic opt-outs,” which could 
increase transparency and salience for consumers, allowing them to 
choose a more generic approach if so desired.77 
The third objection is a moral one, that encouraging the use of socio-
demographics in this way encourages invidious discrimination. For those 
opposed to this approach, the best way to reduce the likelihood of a 
discriminatory market outcome with respect to racial and other socio-
demographic sub-groups in the consumer finance disclosure regime would 
be to prevent market-actors, government, and digital platforms – from 
permitting – and encouraging – discrimination on the basis of race.78 But 
a response might be that we expect the government and private markets to 
encourage ‘positive’ discrimination in other contexts – such as affirmative 
action – where the utility of such discrimination may not be equally 
enhancing for all groups or may be perceived by some to be more harmful 
to other groups. Even in these other contexts, the gathering and analysis of 
“consumer” data serves as a core component of the analysis of the 
effectiveness of such programs.79  
With respect to online contracts in markets that are heavily regulated 
by government, such as those governing financial services, mandated 
information gathering about race, ethnicity, and other factors is critical for 
 
75 See, e.g., Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 283, 305-11 (2003) (surveying the array of concerns as the U.S. transitioned into a 
more digitally connected era, suggesting changes to traditional privacy law to modernize its 
focus, but not discussing socio-demographic information as an area of concern.)  
76 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked 
World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 628 (2015) (reframing privacy debate as one centered on trust 
between the sharer and the recipient and identifying a framework valuing “the socially beneficial 
effects of sharing and [giving] judges a coherent scheme for answering limited privacy 
questions.”) 
77 See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner and Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, 
Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized 
Transactions, 86:2 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (2019). 
78 See Parents Involved in Community Schools vs. Seattle School District #1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007).  
79 See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (2006) (exploring nexus of social 
science research about implicit bias and the effectiveness of affirmative action programs as 
solutions for discrimination). 
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supporting the type of anti-discrimination lawsuits that form the core of 
civil rights litigation in a variety of contexts, including acquisition of 
credit. For example, in the markets for consumer loans and home 
mortgages, lenders subject to the Housing Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(“HMDA”) and/or Regulations B80 and C have long been subject to 
rigorous data-gathering requirements, including asking online and in-
person borrowers about race and other criteria. On an aggregate level, civil 
rights advocates and federal government researchers and law enforcers 
have been able to utilize this demographic information in statistical 
models, identify disparities across institutions, and then sue to recover 
damages and to eliminate racially discriminatory practices.  
Absent the gathering of such data as transactions become more 
digitized, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove, for example, disparate 
impact claims. The data analyses underlying those claims must use proxies 
for race, ethnicity, and gender, since the variables themselves are not 
collected. Thus, the failure to gather (whether secretly through online 
tracking or openly by asking) race and ethnicity information can 
unintentionally benefit lenders and financial institutions, because these 
proxy methodologies used by regulators are imperfect and tend to 
overstate disparities, thus allowing lenders and others to call their validity 
into question.81 It is not terribly hard to find weaknesses in the proxy 
measures. For example, the CFPB utilized Census track surname data from 
Census 2000 to construct its associated consumer contract race and 
ethnicity measures – until April 2017.82   
 
80 Reg. B institutions that receive “an application for credit primarily for the purchase or 
refinancing of a dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the applicant as a principal residence, 
where the extension of credit will be secured by the dwelling, shall request as part of the 
application” the marital status, age, ethnicity, race, and gender of the applicant. Historically Reg 
B data included five data fields: ethnicity, race, sex, marital status, and age, while HMDA 
included only ethnicity, race, and sex. Regardless, these socio-demographic variables could be 
used in a statistical analysis in order to test for their effects holding constant other factors, like 
credit scores.  
81See, e.g., Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, Request for Information Regarding the Bureau’s Inherited 
Regulations and Inherited Rulemaking Authorities 2 (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.afsaonline.org/portals/0/Legal%20and%20Reg/AFSA%20-
%20RFI%20on%20Inherited%20Rules%20-%20June%2025%202018.pdf (critiquing the 
ability of plaintiffs to prove disparate impact for a variety of reasons, including the lack of self-
disclosed individual level data). But see D Adjaye-Gbewonyo et al., Using the Bayesian 
Improved Surname Geocoding Method (BISG) to Create a Working Classification of Race and 
Ethnicity in a Diverse Managed Care Population: A Validation Study, 49(1) HEALTH SERV. 
RES. 268, 277-81 (2014) (concluding the BISG method [which is the CFPB’s preferred] may 
indeed be useful for classifying race/ethnicity of health plan members when needed for health 
care studies). 
82 See, e.g., Update to Proxy Methodology, GITHUB (Apr. 2017), 
https://github.com/cfpb/proxy-methodology. 
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Now imagine how such race proxies are operationalized when it comes 
to that have become more digitized over time; this digitization does not 
necessarily expand anti-discrimination norms nor follow a Bentham-like 
utility maximizing path. Consider the case of the CFPB’s now-rescinded 
indirect auto-lending discrimination rules. Indirect auto-lenders were 
subject to the same ECOA restrictions as credit-card companies–namely 
they were forbidden from gathering certain socio-demographic 
information, including race, ethnicity, and sex.83 As a result, it was difficult 
to test for disparate impact or discrimination in the auto-lending market, 
because such information was not available. However, indirect auto-
lenders engaged in lending practices that yielded differential effects by 
racial sub-groups, through practices such as differential mark-ups on the 
“dealer reserve”.84 To solve for the information-analytics gap, civil rights 
advocates lobbied the CFPB and others to allow for the use of “race 
proxies” in the data-analysis process, because neither in-person nor online 
transactions permitted its acquisition.  
But this use of such proxies gave indirect auto-lenders an easy 
rhetorical target–a flawed methodology would lead to industry ruin. When 
indirect auto-lenders saw that the CFPB intended to subject them to ECOA 
scrutiny for alleged discriminatory pricing racial disparities using this 
flawed methodology, they lobbied Congress to overturn the regulation.85 
And, though not solely for that reason, Congress agreed. The indirect auto-
lending regulation was overturned on May 21, 2018.86 Now the leading 
online direct/indirect auto-lending markets still lack broad-based race-data 
and may have discriminatory racial impacts, but there is still no way to 
directly test for such impacts or to provide consumers with a socio-
demographically attuned contract model. This same lack of supply-side 
socio-demographic information from those searching for online pay-day 
loans also undermines efforts to prove that pay-day lending contracts are 
discriminatory.87  
 
83 See Cons. Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-2 (2013), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf 
(describing the CFPB’s then-interpretation of ECOA with respect to indirect auto-lenders).  
84 They were able to mask discriminatory behavior, in part, due to the absence of race data 
associated with each consumer contract. 
85 See, e.g., Daniel Goldstein, Car Dealers Win First Round in Congress Against CFPB 
Over Auto Loan Discrimination, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 1, 2015), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/did-congress-just-make-it-easier-for-auto-dealers-to-
discriminate-against-you-2015-08-01. 
86 See Cons. Fin. Prot. Bureau, Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (Mar. 21, 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-
Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf. 
87 See, e.g., Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1023, 1038-41 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
Scholars have improved both traditional and digital contract disclosure 
and formation models by incorporating behavioral insights in an effort to 
improve choice architecture and enhance overall utility. But these efforts 
fail to engage the utility of tracking the effect of race on contracting norms, 
selection of contracting terms, and contract literacy/engagement. To 
encourage the gathering (and the analysis) of such information, 
particularly when government has a role in the contract-acquisition and 
formation process between merchants and consumers, government must 
mandate that online disclosures and consumer contracts seek race and 
other demographic information. It is clear that the present incarnation of 
the CFPB, which could lead this effort, seems to have substantially 
downgraded the importance of analyzing race, sex, and other socio-
demographic factors related to consumer information provision and 
consumer anti-discrimination principles in both print and digital spaces.88    
We are just at the beginning stages of understanding how race matters 
in consumer disclosure and consumer contracts. But, if gathering and 
experimenting with such information allows for online platforms to 
customize interfaces and disclosures such that they more effectively reach 
and engage diverse consumers, then there may be an increase consumer 
utility. Further, a more transparent gathering and use of such data will 
allow government (and private actors) to better maintain and enforce anti-
discrimination principles because they can monitor outcomes in ways that 
are presently deeply imperfect. Although this race-conscious approach can 
be operationalized across many sectors, its value may be most salient in 
digital transactions in regulated industries, such as consumer finance, 
where government has the greatest interest in evaluating market 
engagement of consumers of various racial backgrounds to ensure 
fairness. 
 
88 See, e.g., Cons. Fin. Prot. Bureau, Summer 2018: Supervisory Highlights, 12 (Sept. 2018), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_supervisory-highlights_issue-17_2018-
09.pdf (discussing none of these subjects, absent a single sentence). 
